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I. Introduction
Before the Child Welfare Act was introduced in 1980, Senator Cranston stated:
“One of the prime weaknesses of our existing foster care system is that, once a child enters the
system and remains in it for even a few months, the child is likely to become 'lost' in the system.
. . . Foster care, with a few exceptions, should be a temporary placement; unfortunately, under
our existing system, temporary foster care becomes a permanent solution for far too many
children.”1 The history of the foster care system in the United States before the federal Child
Welfare Act was implemented did not provide an incentive for states to help children exit the
system and enter permanent homes. The federal funding that was granted was limited, and
children therefore suffered the consequences of a system that was not fully developed. With the
implementation of the Child Welfare Act in 1980, Congress made an effort to provide a
comprehensive scheme that would incentivize states to create plans regarding how this federal
funding was to be best utilized to benefit the children within the foster care system.2
The program that is established within the Act provides the states with funding from the
federal government, conditioned upon a plan approved by the Department of Health and Human
Services.3 States are able to choose to comply with the Act’s conditions and requirements, or
forgo federal funding.4 The Child Welfare Act requires participating states to reimburse foster
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parents for a list of enumerated costs using the federal funding.5 Under 42 U.S.C. section 672(a),
“each State with a plan approved under this part shall make foster care maintenance payments on
behalf of each child who has been removed from the home or a relative…”6 The plan’s approval
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services is dependent on whether it satisfies thirty-five
criteria, and if it is unable to pass muster under the requirements, the Secretary can give the state
an opportunity to remedy its plan to meet the criterion.7
However, an issue with the Act is the remedy that it provides. When the providers and
foster care families are not receiving the benefits that they are entitled to under the provisions of
the Child Welfare Act, they have no recourse available to them. Raising a child is expensive,
due to the cost of basic essentials like food, clothing, and shelter, without factoring in the even
more costly payments associated with education, and everyday care and supervision. Under the
current structure of the Child Welfare Act, the remedy when states do not comply with the Act’s
requirement of distribution of maintenance payments to individual providers is for the federal
assistance to the state to be refused or eliminated.8 Therefore, providers are stripped of their
funding and the ability to take care of the foster children within their homes. A more effective
measure would enable individual providers to sue the state for maintenance payments. For this
to occur, the court should find an individual private right to foster care maintenance payments
that is enforceable under section 1983. This comment analyzes whether Congress did intend to
confer a new individual right within the Child Welfare Act, and whether that right could be
protected by a section 1983 cause of action.
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In 2012, Kentucky’s Health and Family Services commenced a proceeding against the
mother of two young boys, who had stipulated that she had neglected her children.9 When the
boys were placed in foster care, the mother’s aunt, R.O., sought custody so that the boys were
not subjected to the foster care system.10 After the state conducted a home evaluation and
criminal background check on R.O., the boys were placed into her home by Court Order.11 R.O.
was granted joint custody by the family court to both the mother and the aunt in 2014, but the
boys continued living with the aunt.12 R.O. filed a motion with the court seeking foster care
maintenance payments.13 After the family court declined to rule on whether she could collect
foster care maintenance payments, R.O. sued the Secretary for Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health
and Family Services in state court for payments.14 She argued that “the federal Child Welfare
Act required the state to provide maintenance payments, and that the failure to make payments
violated the Constitution’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.”15 The Cabinet removed
the case to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss.16 The district court granted the Cabinet’s
motion, and in their decision reasoned that because the Child Welfare Act did not provide any
privately enforceable right, the court did not believe that R.O. was entitled to foster care
maintenance payments.17
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit in D.O. v. Glisson ruled that the Child Welfare Act conferred
upon foster families a private right to these maintenance payments, and that the right was
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enforceable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.18 The court’s decision created a circuit split with the
Eighth Circuit, which had previously held in Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Association v.
Kincade, that foster care providers did not have a privately enforceable right of action to recover
maintenance payments under the Child Welfare Act.19 The Sixth Circuit found that there was a
private right of action that was enforceable under section 1983.20 The Sixth Circuit was correct in
ruling, and this comment will analyze the importance of conferring such an individual private
right enforceable under section 1983 to individual foster families and providers.
Part II describes the History of the Child Welfare Act as well as 42 U.S.C. §1983. It
discusses the Blessing test that is applied by the courts to determine whether there is an
individual right intended by Congress. Part III demonstrates the differing interpretations of the
Child Welfare Act by the Eighth Circuit versus the Sixth Circuit which created the circuit split.
Part IV analyzes whether the Child Welfare Act creates an individually enforceable right to
foster care maintenance payments. In doing so, Part IV argues that there is a Section 1983 cause
of action against the states when providers do not receive appropriate funding. Part V concludes
that an individually enforceable right is created and that providers have a Section 1983 cause of
action against the states.
II. History of the Child Welfare Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Part II will address the enactment of the Child Welfare Act. This section will address the
qualifications that must be met by the states and providers to receive foster care maintenance
payments. Additionally, Section II discusses a private right of action under section 1983 and how
court’s have interpreted whether a private individual may enforce the remedies available.
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A. The Child Welfare Act
Before the 1980 when the Child Welfare Act was enacted, Title IV-A of the Social
Security was the main provider of federal financial assistance for children in foster care.21 The
Child Welfare Act was legislation created through the Spending Clause to create a program that
allowed for cooperation between the state and federal government to fund foster care and
adoption programs.22 Typically, when a statute is enacted under the spending power, the typical
remedy taken by the Federal Government is to terminate funds to the State.23 Under the Child
Welfare Act, the federally funded programs included Part B of Title IV of the Social Security
Act, colloquially known the Child Welfare Services Program.24 Additionally, Title IV-E of the
Social Security Act, known as the Foster Care Maintenance Payments Program was also
created.25 The funds that a state expends within the constraints set in the Act are eligible for
partial reimbursement by the federal government.26 The program that is established within the
Act whereby the federal government provides the states with funding, conditioned upon a plan
approved by the Department of Health and Human Services.27 States are able to choose to
comply with the Act’s conditions and requirements, or forgo federal funding.28 The Child
Welfare Act requires participating states to reimburse foster parents for a list of enumerated costs
using the federal funding.29
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Under 42 U.S.C. section 672(a), “each State with a plan approved under this part shall
make foster care maintenance payments on behalf of each child who has been removed from the
home or a relative…”30 The plan’s approval by the Secretary of Health and Human Services is
dependent on whether it satisfies thirty-five criteria, and if it is unable to pass muster under the
requirements, the Secretary can give the state an opportunity to remedy its plan to meet the
criterion.31 If the plan still fails to “substantially conform,”32 the federal government will not
provide funding for the program.33 Within section 671(a)(1), a requirement of each plan is that it
“provide for foster care maintenance payments in accordance with section 672.”34 Foster care
maintenance payments are defined in section 675(4)(A) as meaning “payments to cover the cost
of (and the cost of providing) food, clothing, shelter, daily supervision, school supplies, a child's
personal incidentals, liability insurance with respect to a child, reasonable travel to the child's
home for visitation, and reasonable travel for the child to remain in the school in which the child
is enrolled at the time of placement.”35 The payments are made only “on behalf of a child” that
is eligible under the standard of section 672(a), which requires that the removal and foster care
placement requirements are met and the child would have qualified for assistance under the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children program.36
The Act additionally sets out other qualifications in section 672(b) that further limit who
is eligible to receive these payments, specifying that a child must be either in a foster family
home of an individual or in a private or public child-care institution.37 In defining those terms
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for purposes of the Act, section 672(c) defines a “foster family home” as licensed by the State or
approved to have met the requirements by the State agency with authority to license.38 Further,
“child-care institution” is regarded as a public or private institution with a maximum of twentyfive children, that is also licensed by the State or approved to have met the standard of such an
institution by the State agency with authority to license.39
Under U.S.C. 674(a)(1), the State is then entitled to partial matching reimbursement from
the federal government after paying out maintenance payments.40 Within the statute, it provides
that “each State which has a plan approved under this part shall be entitled to a payment equal to
the sum of…. an amount equal to the Federal medical assistance percentage… of the total
number expended during such quarter as foster care maintenance payments under section 672 of
this title for children in foster family homes or child-care institutions.”41 The Child Welfare Act
grants or denies foster care maintenance payments to States based on whether their plan qualifies
under the Act.
B. 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 is relevant to determine whether an individual foster care
provider has a private right of action against the state under the Child Welfare Act. If a federal
right has been created by the Act, then Section 1983 would allow individuals to enforce their
right to maintenance payments.
Section 1983 states “every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State…subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States…to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and
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laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress…”42 This section allows private individuals to establish a cause of action
if they were intended beneficiaries of federal legislation.43 Section 1983 simply provides a
procedure to enforce these individual rights, not the rights themselves.44 Section 1983 does not
speak in terms of violations of federal law, but rather the deprivation of rights, privileges or
immunities guaranteed by the Constitution, and therefore, a federal right must be created by the
statute in question.45 The understanding of section 1983 is specifically to enforce rights, and not
the broader understanding of possible “benefits” or “interests” that an individual may assert.46
Private citizens are able to enforce these remedies, unless one of two circumstances exists.47 If
“the statute [does] not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of
section 1983,” then the remedies of section 1983 are not enforceable.48 Therefore, the creation
of a private right within the statute is crucial.
Additionally, private individuals may not enforce these remedies if within the statute
itself, Congress has “foreclosed enforcement” under section 1983.49 Congress has the ability to
either expressly forbid an individual’s recourse under section 1983, or may do so implicitly.50 If
the statute contains a remedial scheme that is “sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate a
congressional intent to withdraw the private remedy of 1983,” then Congress has implicitly
foreclosed enforcement under 1983.51 The difficult showing must be made that the scheme that
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Congress has implemented within the statute would be inconsistent with allowing a section 1983
action.52 Where Congress has foreclosed, a dismissal of the case would be appropriate.53
The inquiry of whether a remedy is available under section 1983 begins with whether a
private right was intended by Congress upon creation of the statute. When determining whether
a particular statutory provision gives right to a federal right, the Court has looked at three factors
established in Blessing v. Freestone.54 Before beginning the analysis through the three-part test
of Blessing, the Court requires that the specific provision that creates individual rights be
identified, rather analyzing the Act in its entirety.55 The first factor to be considered is “whether
Congress intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff.”56 In this inquiry, the
Court looks to the determine whether the statute has an “individual entitlement” that is
“unambiguously conferred” but the use of “rights-creating language.”57 Specifically, the
language of the statute must be “phrased in terms of the persons benefitted.”58 Second, it must be
demonstrated by plaintiff that the asserted right is not so “vague and amorphous that its
enforcement would strain judicial competence.”59 Finally, the statute in question “must
unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States.”60 This final element has been
interpreted as meaning that the statute in question must contain “mandatory rather than precatory
terms.”61
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Under this analysis, the courts have made it abundantly clear that Congress’s intent must
be unambiguous within the statute to confer individual rights.62 Due to the court’s emphasis on
congressional intent, if a plaintiff can demonstrate that the statute creates an individually
enforceable right under section 1983, there is only a rebuttable presumption created.63 In
ascertaining congressional intent, evidence may be drawn directly from the statute itself or
“inferred from the statute’s creation of a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is
incompatible with individual enforcement under [section] 1983.”64 In sum, the courts apply the
Blessing test to determine whether there is a private right of action conferred upon individuals
under Section 1983.
III. The Interpretation of the Child Welfare Act Created a Circuit Split Between the Eighth and
Sixth Circuits
A. The Eighth Circuit Rules that there is No Congressional Intent of a Privately
Enforceable Right Within the Child Welfare Act.
Courts have struggled with the question of whether there is Congressional intent to confer
foster care maintenance payments under the Child Welfare Act. The Eighth Circuit has
concluded that Congress did not intend to create a privately enforceable right to foster care
maintenance payments within the Child Welfare Act. In Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass'n
v. Kincade, a case was brought by six individual foster care providers and two organizations
representing Missouri foster care providers against Missouri state officials who implement the
foster care program within the state.65 The collective group of providers claimed in their
complaint that the Child Welfare Act of 1980 gave them a privately enforceable right under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to receive foster care maintenance payments enumerated in the Child Welfare
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Act.66 The State of Missouri argued that the provision of the Child Welfare Act should be
interpreted to constrain who is to receive the funding and provide an enumerated list of types of
expenses that the government should have to provide matching funding for.67 In opposition, the
providers argue that the correct understanding of section 672(a) grants eligible foster care entities
with an individually enforceable right through section 1983 to payments sufficient to cover the
enumerated list in section 675(4)(A) defining foster care maintenance payments.68
In its decision, the Court noted that under the first prong of the test established in
Blessing, Congress must have intended the statutory provision at issue to specifically benefit the
plaintiff.69 The Court clarified that in analyzing the provision under the first prong of the test,
there must be an “unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action under section
1983.70 The Court reviewed the existence of a federally enforceable right by looking to the three
factors considered in Gonzaga under the first prong of the Blessing test. The Court looked for
rights-creating language in terms of the individual persons benefitted, manifestation of an
individual focus rather than an aggregate one, and whether Congress provided a federal review
mechanism within the statute.71
Under the first factor, the Court determined that there was no rights creating language
within the statute.72 As a finding, the Court determined that “where the statutory language
primarily concerns itself with commanding how states are to function within a federal program,
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the statute is less likely to have created an individually enforceable right.”73 The Court reasoned
that the focus was a limitation on the expenditures of the state that would be matched, rather than
on the interests of the providers.74 The Child Welfare Act was interpreted by the Court to regard
the states as “regulated participants in the CWA” and was not phrased in terms of the states as
beneficiaries of the Act.75 In finding that the language of the statute was not “phrased in terms of
the persons benefitted”, the Court stated that the language was necessary so that section 1983
enforcement was only available to alleged violations of federal rights, rather than simply
violations of federal law.76 The finding of a connection between section 1983 plaintiffs and a
benefit by the statute is necessary, but not sufficient to create a private right.77
In considering the second prong of the Blessing test, the Court looked to whether the
statute had an individual focus, thus giving rise to individual rights.78 An aggregate focus within
the statute does not give rise to individual rights.79 The Court stated that “when a statute links
funding to substantial compliance with its conditions—including forming and adhering to a state
plan with specified features—this counsels against the creation of individually enforceable
rights.”80 This is because in creating a compliance scheme within a statute, even when the state
complies with its responsibilities to receive federal funding, individual beneficiaries may still not
receive the full spectrum of benefits offered within the statute.81 Here, the Court focused on the

73

Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1197.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass'n v. Kincade, 712 F.3d 1190, 1199.
78
Id. at 1197.
79
Id. at 1199.
80
Id. at 1197.
81
Id. at 1200-01.
74

12

substantial compliance element within the statute, and determined that the statute was not
concerned with whether the needs of one particular foster care facility were satisfied.82
Additionally, the Court stated that another indication that the statute was not individually
focused where “each…. reference to [the asserted individual right] is in the context of describing
the type of [action] that triggers a funding prohibition.”83 In the language of the Child Welfare
Act, if the state fails to meet the enumerated requirements when creating their plan regarding
foster care maintenance payments, they are denied funding by the federal government.84
Although the funding prohibition is not explicitly stated, the effect of not complying with the
Act’s requirements is just that: a funding prohibition.85 The court notes that it has never found
individually enforceable rights where the statute has referenced a restriction of funding.86
Finally, the Court looked to the final prong of the Blessing test, which establishes that
where the statute provides for a “federal review mechanism” within the statute , its existence cuts
against the inference that Congress intended to create an individual right enforceable under
section 1983.87 Under the Child Welfare Act, oversight regarding the funding restrictions is
provided by the Secretary of Health and Human Services for states that choose to participate in
the program.88 But even with this procedure in place, the Court stated that a direct federal
review of the claims of statutory violations made by individual providers does not exist within
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the Act.89 Instead, the claims are delegated to the individual states to deal with and federal
review is explicitly limited.90
In its conclusion, the Court reasoned that although there was no federal reviewing
mechanism for individuals, the other factors considered under the first prong of the Blessing test
swayed towards there being no congressional intent to create an individually enforceable right
under the Child Welfare Act.91 Rejecting the argument that it was sufficient to overcome the
other factors due to the finding that there was no federal review instrument in place, the court
reasoned that it did not need to analyze the remaining prongs of the Blessing test since it could
not be established that there was unambiguous congressional intent.92 The court held that
Congress did not confer such a right, and therefore affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the
complaint for failure to state a claim .93
B. The Sixth Circuit -- the CWA Confers a Privately Enforceable Right Under Section
1983.
Nevertheless, not all Circuits have been persuaded by the Eighth’s Circuit’s ruling that
Congress did not intend to create a private right of action. In contrast, in the Sixth Circuit, the
aunt of two boys placed in foster care sued the Security for Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health and
Family Services for foster care maintenance payments.94 She argued that the federal Child
Welfare Act created an enforceable private right to these payments, and failure of the state to
make them violated Equal Protection and Due Process of the United States Constitution.95 The
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district court dismissed the case, and reasoned that Act did not provide any privately enforceable
rights that could be enforced by section 1983.96
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit looked to three relevant sections of the Child Welfare Act to
determine whether there was a privately enforceable right.97 First, the court looked at section
671(a), which provides that a state must submit a plan to the Secretary to be eligible for federal
funding. Next, the Court stated that the plan must conform to the requirements within section
672 of the Act, stating that “[e]ach State with a plan approved under this part shall make foster
care maintenance payments on behalf of each child who has been removed from the home of a
relative… into foster care.”98 Foster care maintenance payments are defined in an enumerated list
in section 675(4)(A) of the Act, and cover the cost of shelter, food, and clothing, in addition to
other crucial costs accrued.99 The final provision of the Act considered in the case at hand was
regarding when states may seek reimbursement from the federal government for maintenance
payments made to foster families.100 Section 674(a)(1) states that states are eligible for an
“amount equal to the Federal medical assistance percentage… of the total amount expended
during such quarter as foster care maintenance payments under section 672” for children under
the care of foster homes or child-care institutions as defined by the statute.101
The Court considered the same factors established in the Blessing test to find whether
there was an individually enforceable right.102 First, the Court found that the Act’s language
mandating payments “on behalf of each child” focused on the benefits to individual recipients,
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rather than simply speaking to the implementation of the policy on the state.103 Under the first
prong of the Blessing test, the Court reasoned that the Act requiring individual payments focused
on the needs of the individual children within the foster care system, rather than an aggregate
focus, which would not give rise to an individually enforceable right.104
In addition, section 675(4)(A) of the Act has a specific list of expenses that the
maintenance payments must cover, and therefore the Court determined that there were no “vague
and amorphous” terms that would strain the judiciary’s interpretation.105 The State argues that
because the specific amounts that the State is required to pay are not quantified within the
statute, the Child Welfare Act is not specific enough and therefore is not enforceable under
section 1983.106 But the Court provides that because there is a reasonable methodology that the
State has established in calculating foster care maintenance payments, the statute is not deemed
to be unenforceable for being indefinite.107 Giving the state’s discretion in establishing what the
rates were does not mean that there is no recognizable private right to a monetary benefits under
the Act.108
Under the final prong of the Blessing test, the Court found that the language of section
672(a)(1) stating that the state “shall make foster care maintenance payments” imposed an
obligation on the states because it was phrased in mandatory terms.109 The Court notes that if
Congress had wanted the Act to “serve as a roadmap for the conditions a state must fulfill in
order for its expenditure to be eligible for federal matching funds” like the State argued, it would
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not have chosen to frame the statute in mandatory terms.110 Simply put, the Court stated that
payment by the states under the Child Welfare Act “isn’t optional.”111 The State argued that the
Act speaks to the states as participants within the construct of the Act by referring to the state as
the subject.112 Rejecting the State’s argument, the Court concluded that the Supreme Court and
the Sixth Circuit have both affirmed that laws phrased in the active voice where the state is the
subject have previously been found to confer individual rights, like in Harris and Wilder.113
Noting that under the third prong of the Blessing test, Congress must “impose a binding
obligation on the States” with the language of the statute, the court concluded that the Child
Welfare Act requires a mandatory action on the part of the states.114 In conclusion, the Court
established that under the Blessing test, section 672(a) of the Child Welfare Act conferred an
individual enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments.115
Under the analysis of Blessing, the creation of a private right only establishes a rebuttable
presumption that the right can be enforced under section 1983, and therefore the court had to
determine whether Congress intended for the statute to create such a private right.116 To
determine whether the congressional intent exists, the court can look directly to the provision of
the statute, or it can also be inferred from Congress’s creation of an enforcement scheme within
the statute that would be inconsistent with an individual’s right to enforce under section 1983.117
Here, the Court found that the enforcement mechanisms were not sufficient to foreclose an
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individual’s access to section 1983 remedies.118 Specifically, the Act requires that a state
establish a plan, but there is no process established within the Act that a foster care provider
could use to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Child Welfare Act if the state
completely neglects to pay foster care maintenance payments.119 The Court concluded that the
Child Welfare Act did not include any private federal review mechanism that a foster family
could employ when they were denied payments required under the Act.120 Therefore, the Court
held that the Child Welfare Act did confer upon foster families and providers an individual right
to maintenance payments that was enforceable under section 1983.121
To recap, the Eighth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have analyzed the same question
regarding whether the Child Welfare Act confers a private right of action but have reached
opposite conclusions. Part IV examines the policy implications of these decisions and
demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the Child Welfare Act is not only correct
as a matter of interpretation, but also to further foster children’s interests throughout the United
States.
IV. The Child Welfare Act and Section 1983 Create an Individually
A. The Court Has Established a Private Right in Act’s with Similar Language.
Where an Act has contained similar language to that of the Child Welfare Act, the courts
have found that an individually enforceable right has been created. Throughout the United States,
courts have applied the Blessing test to determine what creates an individually enforceable right.
The court looks first to whether the provision of the statute benefits the plaintiff.122 In Harris,
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the court found that using the phrase “any individual eligible for medical assistance” within the
statute used terminology that was individually focused enough to “unambiguously confer an
individual entitlement.”123 The court concluded that the provision was intended specifically with
its beneficiaries in mind, and therefore the plaintiff was intended to benefit from the Medicaid
provision at issue.124
In juxtaposition, the language at issue in Gonzaga states: “No funds shall be made
available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a
policy or practice of permitting the release of educations records (or personally identifiable
information contained therein…) of students without the written consent of their parents to any
individual, agency or organization.”125 The court held in this case that the statute did not grant
any individual right because of the lack of rights-creating language within the statute that would
have given rise to Congress’s intent to create new rights.126 Rather than speaking in terms of an
individual right of the students, the Act spoke in terms of the institution that the Act sought to
govern. The language of the statute clearly does not speak in terms of any individual to be
benefitted, and focused rather on the “institutional policy and practice” that is to be regulated by
the statute.127
In section 672(a), the Child Welfare Act specifically focuses on the individual foster care
providers that are intended to be protected by the statute. By stating that the state makes foster
care payments “on behalf of each child,” the statute is focused on payment to the providers, who
in turn are benefitting the children protected by the Act. The statute is not focused on the

123

Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 461 (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287).
Id. at 461-62.
125
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)).
126
D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 378.
127
Cal. State Foster Parent Ass'n v. Wagner, 624 F.3d 974, 980 (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273,
288).
124

19

institutions regulated, but rather the actual individuals that are meant to be protected by requiring
distribution of foster care maintenance payments. Distinct from the statute in Gonzaga, there is
no aggregate focus on the institution as a whole here. Instead, Congress was focused on the
situations of the individual providers.128 Additionally, the inclusion of the term “each”
emphasizes an individual focus on the specific children within the system. The statute designates
that the foster care providers are to receive these maintenance payments “on behalf of each
child”, and this specific language is directed at providers and is to be interpreted by the court to
benefit the individual foster parents and providers.
Second, it must be demonstrated by the plaintiff that the right protected within the statute
is not so “vague and amorphous” that enforcing it would “strain judicial competence.”129 Where
the statute is not definitive and specific, the Court can declare that it would not qualify under
section 1983 enforcement. It cannot be understood that Congress would have intended to confer
a right where it would be too difficult for the judiciary to enforce. But, the court has declared that
a statute cannot be declared to be unenforceable in “the absence of a uniform federal
methodology for setting rates.”130
Under section 675(4)(A), the specific definition of what constitutes a “foster care
maintenance payment” is enumerated with an itemized list of what that state is required to cover
under the Act.131 Congress specifically listed certain necessities that it deemed were necessary to
be covered by the foster care maintenance payments, including “food, clothing, shelter, daily
supervision, school supplies, a child’s personal incidentals, liability insurance with respect to a
child, reasonable travel to the child’s home for visitation, and reasonable travel for the child to
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remain in the school in which the child is enrolled at the time of placement.”132 With this
extremely explicit list recited within the statute, there is no way that the provision at issue could
be interpreted as ambiguous in regards to what payments are to be made on behalf of each child.
Additionally, there is discretion allotted for the states to choose the reasonable method of how to
calculate the rates of the maintenance payments.133 Simply because the amounts paid out to
foster parents is not specifically stated within the Act does not threaten enforcement by the
judiciary.134 As long as the state has a plan that fits the requirements of the Act, the court is still
able to implement a standard to assess whether the state is in compliance with the statute. As a
result, there is no way that the enforcement of the identified right would strain the Court’s ability
to enforce the right under section 1983.
Finally, the Blessing analysis requires that the statute unambiguously create a binding
obligation on the States with mandatory language.135 Within the statute at issue in Harris, it
stated that “[a] State plan… must… provide.”136 The court deemed that this language
established Congress’s intent to phrase the statute in terms of binding language, rather than
simply advising the states of their obligations under the statute.137 Additionally, in Price, the
court deemed an almost completely analogous provision to contain mandatory language that
satisfied the final prong of the test. Both provisions within the statute require that the grantee
states of the federal funding make payments to individuals who were intended to benefit from the
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Act.138 As the court stated in D.O., if Congress had intended for the statute to simply be a
“roadmap” that the states could follow, then it would not have used mandatory terminology to
dictate what the states must do in order to receive funding.139 Congress in its creation of laws
and legislation knows how to frame a statute in non-binding terms. If reading the statute in the
manner that Congress intended, it must be interpreted as a mandatory obligation placed upon the
states. In stating that “[e]ach State with a plan approved… shall make foster care maintenance
payments…” Congress used mandatory language by using “shall” to describe the state’s
obligation under the Act in regards to payments.140 Congress also intentionally used the active
voice in describing what the state must do to receive funding to make the obligation obviously
mandatory on the States.
In conclusion, it must be interpreted that the Child Welfare Act was meant to be confer
an individually enforceable right to providers and individual foster families.
B. Congress Did Intend an Individual Right Enforceable under Section 1983.
When interpreting the Child Welfare Act, a private individual right must be conferred. When
it is established that there is a privately enforceable individual right in the statute,
the analysis is not concluded. Because the focus within the provision is on the congressional
intent to determine whether it produces a federal right, there is only a rebuttable presumption that
the right is enforceable under section 1983.141 Evidence of congressional intent can be drawn
directly from the language of the statute that created the right.142 In the case of Gonzaga, the
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State found that Congress expressly stated that the Secretary of Education was to “deal with
violations” of the Act, and provided an explicit framework.143 The court found that the statute
established a mechanism that Congress provided to remedy violations of the Act.144 Therefore,
enforcement under section 1983 was not necessary for an individual to remedy their situation.145
In contrast, Within the language of the Child Welfare Act, there is no explicit statement of
Congress’s intent to expressly foreclose an individual’s access to a section 1983 cause of action.
No language exists to determine what action is to be taken by an individual if the state does not
abide by its plan in compliance with the Child Welfare Act.
Where the remedy is not explicitly renounced, congressional intent can still be
inferred.146 If the statute creates a scheme that is “sufficiently comprehensive”, the Court has
concluded that it is sufficient to infer Congress’s intent to disallow a remedy under section
1983.147 The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that having a provision establishing an
ability to reduce or terminate funding when states do not comply with the statute is sufficient to
find that Congress has foreclosed access to a section 1983 remedy.148
A showing must be made that enforcement of an action under section 1983 would be
wholly inconsistent with the scheme that Congress has implemented within the statute.149 As of
the case of Blessing v. Freestone, the Court had only find two schemes sufficiently
comprehensive to oust enforcement under section 1983.150 Where the Court found that a federal
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statute had the congressional intent to foreclose, the remedial scheme was much more
comprehensive than the one established in the Child Welfare Act.151 Here, the Act does not
establish any private judicial enforcement within its provisions that would allow an individual to
enforce the right to foster care maintenance payments. The Child Welfare Act provides no
administrative means that would allow a provider to ask the state to make payments that they
have not been granted.152 Therefore, the Act should not be viewed as foreclosing access to
section 1983 enforcement.
Within the Child Welfare Act, there is no remedial scheme that would be inconsistent
with section 1983 enforcement. Section 1983 is intended to allow private individuals to establish
a cause of action if they were intended to be beneficiaries of federal legislation.153 There is no
remedy that is afforded to foster parents and institutions intended to benefit from the Act that
would allow for them to ensure foster maintenance payments are made. The Secretary only
reviews the states plans for compliance with the Act, but they do not have the authority to
actually make sure that the states provide the individual foster caretakers with the benefits
guaranteed by the Act.154 In essence, the states could implement a plan that conforms to the
federal requirements and be approved by the Secretary, and yet never make payments to foster
care providers.155
Therefore, the court must interpret Congress’s intent to provide an individually
enforceable right under section 1983.
C. Policy Implications Call for the Child Welfare Act to Confer an Individual Right to
Foster Care Maintenance Payments Enforceable under Section 1983.
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The Child Welfare Act is a huge move forward in the reform of the foster care system.
Prior to the implementation of the Act, foster families caring for children were only granted
financial assistance if they qualified for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
which stringently limited which children were eligible for federal funding.156 For example,
federal assistance was given to states strictly for foster care, and not for adoption, which
removed the incentive for states to place children into adoptive homes because of the risk of a
loss of funding.157 As a result, the children within the system were forced to stay in foster
homes for much longer periods than anticipated, which would result in a greater likelihood that
the child would be “lost” within the system.158 Before 1980 when the Act was passed, the Social
Security Act provided funding for a larger range of services than what was actually used in
practice.159 In practice, Congress devoted a maximum of $56.6 million, although around $266
million was authorized for Title IV-B use.160
With the establishment of the Child Welfare Act in 1980, states are given the incentive of
receiving federal funding for their compliance with the Act. This motivation to create plans that
comply with the Act in turn enables states to fund foster care and adoption assistance services.161
By implementing these plans, the foster care systems throughout the states are much more
comprehensive than they were prior to the Act’s implementation in 1980. As a result of state
funding being conditioned upon established plans that must be approved by the Department of
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Health and Human Services, the Child Welfare Act is clearly a comprehensive endeavor by
Congress to improve the foster care system.162
But, the system created within the Act is not without its flaws, particularly if the Court
does not find that there is a privately enforceable right to maintenance payments under section
1983. When states do not comply with the Act, their federal funding will be either reduced or
eliminated.163 Under section 1320a-2a, the Secretary is granted the right to determine whether
the states plan “substantially conforms” with the federal requirements.164 If the plan is
determined to not conform, then the Secretary is not simply given the power, but is required to
withhold federal funding.165 Within the language of the Act, there is no other recourse available
to remedy the situation for individuals.166 As a result, when the states do not comply with the
requirements within the Act, the individual foster families and child care providers suffer the loss
of federal funding without any ability to remedy their situations. The individuals that are
intended to be benefitted by the maintenance payments are therefore hurt by the cutting off of
federal assistance. By permitting the use of a section 1983 claim of action for maintenance
payments, the children within the foster care system and the individuals who cares for them are
not deprived of the ability to purchase basic necessities, such as clothing and food.
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, the correct interpretation of the Child Welfare Act of 1980 is the Sixth
Circuit’s understanding in D.O. v. Glisson. The Act does create an individually enforceable right
to foster care maintenance payments for an individual foster care family and foster care provider
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as defined under the statute. The language of the Child Welfare Act created by Congress confers
a right due to its mandatory language within the statute, as well as the binding obligation
imposed on the states, who are granted reasonable deference in establishing the exact rate at
which these payments are distributed.
Due to the Child Welfare Act conferring a right to individuals, the next step in the
analysis is considering whether enforcement under section 1983 is appropriate. Once a plaintiff
demonstrates that a statute creates a privately enforceable right, there is only a rebuttable
presumption that the right is therefore enforceable under section 1983. Evidence of congressional
intent is important to show that Congress either did or did not intend access to a section 1983
remedy upon creation of the new right within the statute. Evidence can be found either explicitly
within the statute itself, or it can be inferred from the creation of a sufficiently comprehensive
scheme that would make enforcement under section 1983 incompatible with the statute.
In the Child Welfare Act, there is no explicit access to a remedy for non-payment of
foster care maintenance payments. Individual providers and foster care families do not have any
explicit right within the statute to remedy a situation where they do not receive funds that they
are entitled to under the Act.
Additionally, the scheme within the statute does not sufficiently preclude an individual
from seeking enforcement through section 1983. There is no explicit process through which
individuals are able to seek benefits that they are not provided for. Providers are not given any
framework that they are able to follow to seek monetary relief from the state when maintenance
payments are not distributed to enable them to cover the costs of the children placed within their
home or institution. The Child Welfare Act’s mechanisms to enforce the right to these foster
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care maintenance payments do not sufficiently foreclose an individual’s access to section 1983
remedies.
Although the foster care system has taken steps forward since the implementation of the
Child Welfare Act in 1980, there still must be a remedy available for those that are not granted
federally funded payments by their state. In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit’s holding that Congress
intended to confer a private right to foster care maintenance payments specifically enumerated
within the Child Welfare Act that is enforceable under section 1983 is correct. Therefore, the
Court needs to protect those intended to be benefitted, and interpret the Act as establishing a
right for foster care institutions and foster families to entitlement of the payments that they are
owed.
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